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CONTEMPORARY commentators on theatre
during the Second World War and immedi -
ately after claimed that they were witnessing
a ‘revolution in the arts’, both with respect to
the perceived quality of wartime repertoires
as well as, and perhaps more importantly, to
the introduction of state subsidies. Bernard
Miles asserted that the fact that CEMA (the
Council for Encouragement of Music and the
Arts, which funded theatres and companies)
received Treasury money
within four months of its foundation meant that
for the first time in history the state recognized the
drama as one of the sinews of the national soul,
and this was the most important thing that had
happened to the British theatre since the birth of
Shakespeare.1
Basil Dean hailed the introduction of govern -
ment support for the arts as ‘the most forward
step in the advancement of British culture
that a British Government has yet taken’, and
other commentators and practitioners were
equally ecstatic.2 A spate of publications in
the early 1940s on opera, ballet, and theatre,
the sheer volume of which is astonishing,
accompanied a change in cultural policy and
perception of the arts, and illustrates the
importance attributed to this change. 
It is surprising, then, that theatre in Britain
during the Second World War has received
comparatively little scholarly atten tion. The
radical changes the war instigated especially
in terms of government subsidy have at best
been briefly alluded to,3 and even the Cam -
bridge History of British Theatre only men tions
them in passing.4 Clive Barker and Maggie
Gale’s incisive collection of essays con cerns
the interwar years,5 Steve Nicholson has
done excellent work on cen sorship and on
specific aspects of wartime theatre, such as
the politically motivated pageants staged in
the Royal Albert Hall in support of the Soviet
Union,6 and elsewhere Simon Trussler has
offered an insightful though brief summary
of wartime theatre.7 However, a comprehen -
sive study of this period is still missing. 
For example, the crucial role played by
CEMA for an emerging cultural policy, which
placed popular education and propaganda
through the arts at its heart, has only recently
been subject to a rigorous investigation; this,
however, focuses on policy decisions rather
than on the question of what their imple -
men tation meant for theatres and their audi -
ences.8 Too often, CEMA has only been seen
as the forerunner of the Arts Council and not
as a worthwhile object of study in itself.
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Overall, the ‘revolution in the arts’, which
the beginning of the war triggered, and
which has had long-lasting effects on theatre
in Britain, warrants a thorough investigation
– if only to refute Dennis Kennedy’s claim
that, with regard to the Second World War
and the destruction inflicted on the city by
the Luftwaffe, ‘the most obvious effects of the
conflict on London theatre were physical’.9
After the Outbreak of War
After a short period of closure following the
declaration of war on 3 September 1939,
theatres all over Britain were subsequently
allowed to reopen. The motivation for this
decision went beyond the idea of distracting
audiences weary of the war effort, and exem -
plified more general demands on the arts
and their role in society. This war against
Nazi Germany was no ordinary war, but a
conflict between ideologies. It went beyond
the ‘Hun bashing’ of the First World War and
developed into a struggle to defend the values
of the civilized world against Nazi bar -
barism.10 This time what was called for was
not just entertainment of the kind that Lena
Ashwell (among others) had provided in the
French war zones during the First World
War; now, Britain seemed to be fighting for
its cultural heritage. The theatre which corre s -
ponded to these claims had to be uplifting,
educational, and national. 
As early as the summer of 1940, officials
perceived a direct link between a particular
repertoire programme and rising morale.
One of the issues at hand was anticipation
(confounded by events) of a quiet winter in
1940–41, as in the ‘phoney war’ of 1939–4o,
with possible weakening of morale. Enter -
tain ment for the forces and the civilian popu -
lation was of the highest importance, but, as
officials such as Kenneth Clark stressed, what
was called for was not just any kind of enter -
tainment ‘of the film or music hall order, but
something to occupy people’s minds’. He
explicitly demanded that the government
ought ‘to take some active part in stimu -
lating activities of this sort’.11
This active part soon began to take shape
in the question of the Sunday opening of
theatres, an issue which met with increasing
support among the general public.12 In Feb -
ru ary 1941, the government agreed to allow
theatre performances on Sundays for the first
time in three hundred years, and commen -
tators celebrated having ‘won the battle’.13
Although Parliament shortly afterwards voted
against this initiative by a small majority of
eight votes, the government had neverthe -
less demonstrated how much it was willing
to sacrifice for theatrical entertainment dur -
ing the war – the resistance of the Church had
been especially substantial – and how highly
it rated its contribution to the war effort.14
ENSA and CEMA
More successfully, the government began to
support the performing arts through regu lar
state subsidies – for the first time in British
history – realizing and increasingly hoping
to influence the theatre’s propaganda poten -
tial. Whereas ENSA (the Entertainments
National Services Association) continued to
offer an entertainment programme to the
forces similar to the one provided during the
First World War, CEMA’s mission was dif -
ferent and was directed at the home front.15
The two organizations also differed in their
political agenda, since CEMA’s aim to foster
the arts through state support pointed
beyond the end of military action and hinted
at a future Britain in which the arts would
become an integral part of everyday life.16
CEMA was established in January 1940 as
a result of a meeting held at the Board of
Education.17 The initial objective was to give
financial assistance to drama and music soci -
eties who found it difficult to maintain their
activities during the war. The broader aim
was to boost morale through the provision of
art. At first CEMA was jointly financed by
the Pilgrim Trust and the Treasury, with the
Trust’s grant of £25,000 being matched by a
government subsidy of the same sum. Two
years later the government accepted full finan-
cial responsibility for CEMA.18
By 1945, the Treasury grant had risen to
£235,000,19 and the overall sum spent on
CEMA and (from 1946) the Arts Council bet -
ween 1940 and 1950 reached over £2 mil -
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lion.20 This financial backing not only meant
that the state for the first time in British his -
tory had become a patron of the performing
arts, but also showed that the arts were seen
as being of national importance. 
The initial emphasis on amateur societies
soon changed to support for professional com-
panies. In diversified programmes CEMA
brought classical music, the visual arts, and
drama to remote rural areas as well as indus -
trial centres, catered for evacuees, and recog -
nized the need to counterbalance the closure
of many customary entertainment facilities,
long working hours, and monotonous leisure
time.21 Its support varied from full financial
responsibility to no financial connection at
all. In between there were block grants,
loans, and limited guarantees against loss.22
Soon after its foundation, CEMA became
associated with many stars and leading en -
sembles. Sadler’s Wells Ballet, Ballet Rambert
and Ballet Jooss, for example, toured fac -
tories, garrisons, and hostels; and the Old Vic
company starring Sybil Thorndike took
Shake speare through Welsh mining villages
for several consecutive seasons.23 After hav -
ing been seen as a rather un-English exercise
with marginal well-to-do audiences concen -
trated in London, ballet during the war
played to capacity houses and successfully
found new audiences.24 Opera, too, took on a
new lease of life thanks to the support of
CEMA, and Sadler’s Wells toured the indus -
trial towns of the North.25
‘Educational Value’ and Propaganda
Chamber music recitals were organized in
factory canteens, and symphony concerts
were put on for war workers.26 Pablo Casals
played Elgar’s Cello Concerto for the stan -
dard fee of three guineas, Yehudi Menuhin
gave a series of recitals for factory workers,
and Myra Hess regularly performed for lunch-
hour audiences in the National Gallery, which
had been emptied of pictures.27 CEMA’s
biggest and most influential undertaking,
how ever, was the opening of the Theatre
Royal, Bristol, as the first state theatre in
British history, and the establishment of the
Old Vic as a true (that is, continental) reper -
tory company with a programme of classics.28
CEMA’s agenda – and by extension that of
the government – was not solely philan -
thropic but part of a wider political prog -
ramme which sought to provide audiences
even in the remotest parts of the British Isles
with works of high art from the established
canon. In a war which was being increasingly
fought on the Home Front, the arts became a
vital weapon to remind people what the
country was fighting for, and CEMA was
precisely providing this ‘national service’,29
supporting companies whose programmes
were deemed to have ‘educational value’.30
One of the ways in which help was pro -
vided was with exemption from Enter tain -
ment Tax, which, according to contemporary
practitioners, ‘conferred a much larger finan -
cial benefit than anything CEMA could afford
to give’.31 The ‘educational value’ of pro -
grammes became in fact central to CEMA’s
policy. In a highly interesting ‘Memorandum
on Old Vic Policy’ sent by Tyrone Guthrie in
September 1943 to CEMA’s Lewis Casson,
Guthrie stated under the heading ‘Education
v. Entertainment’ that:
It will be seen the whole trend of this document is
to advocate a policy related as closely as possible
to the educational life of the country, and distin -
guishing as much as possible from other theatrical
enterprise; i.e. a declared policy of ‘Education’ as
opposed to ‘Entertainment’. Suggest: a) If the
productions are good and lively enough this does
not matter. b) If the productions are dreary they
still won’t [work] well as entertainment. c) By and
large the audiences for whom we cater will be
intelligent enough not to be frightened by the
label ‘Education’; and the audience in search of a
‘spree’ will not go to Shake speare etc. anyway.
BUT we must be on our guard against the attitude
that a classic is only uplifting if it is dowdy; and
the devotees who always cluster round a move -
ment of uplift. In other words, our social service
must be oblique – it must not reek of social ser -
vice, but show itself in artistic vitality.32
Interestingly this agenda was no secret as
CEMA openly stated that it hoped to create
‘permanent, educated audiences all over the
country’ – and the popular success of its pro -
jects seemed to validate this approach.33
Such an approach only a few years earlier
would hardly have been welcomed by many
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audiences and commentators, who would
have echoed Norman Marshall’s claim that
‘the Englishman has nothing against educa -
tion but he thinks it should be kept in its
place. He resents any attempt to mix it with
his amusements.’34 Barry Jackson in Birming-
ham was thus suspected of ‘sinister motives’
when presenting a repertoire which was seen
as too intellectually challenging. This, how -
ever, was exactly what CEMA set out to do. 
The government was quick to make use of
CEMA’s success. Concerning its cultural
propaganda it followed a double strategy.
On the one hand it became increasingly pre -
pared to subsidize the performing arts on an
unprecedented scale, on the other it was
keen to associate itself with artists who were
supporting the war effort without apparent
financial gain. The tour of the Old Vic through
Welsh mining villages illustrates this strategy.
It was extensively documented and widely
publicized by the Ministry of Information.
However, although mentioning govern ment
involvement, the Ministry stressed the per -
sonal touch and basic working con ditions of
the ensemble – a far cry from the luxurious
life style of the theatre stars of the 1930s.35
Propaganda publications such as Bulletins
from Britain promoted this strategy world -
wide.36 They regularly featured articles
about the theatre, and in particular about
productions of Shakespearean drama, and
more or less directly linked the success of
these ventures to Britain’s war effort.37
Regional Theatre – and a National Theatre
Part of this wider programme – and another
aspect overlooked by research so far – was a
concept of arts provision for all which pointed
beyond the end of the war, as exemplified,
among other things, by government support
for a Civic Theatres Scheme.38 The scheme
proposed that cities should be able to open
their own municipal theatres jointly financed
by local and state subsidies.39 At the inaugu -
ral meeting of the Provincial Theatre Council
in 1942 the Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin,
expressed his hopes that the future theatre
would become ‘one of our great national
institutions to convey to the peoples of the
world the real character of the ordinary
British people’.40
At the heart of the government’s support
for these plans was not only a belief in the
important role regional theatres could play
in the war effort, but also a concept of muni -
cipal theatre provision which pointed at the
long-term future – of which the Local Gov -
ern ment Act of 1948 was a direct outcome. It
was Section 132 of this Act that empowered
local authorities to provide and maintain
civic theatres. 
Even the idea of a National Theatre, after
decades of opposition and fruitless cam -
paign ing, from 1942 suddenly received state
support.41 After the outbreak of the war the
Old Vic had increasingly developed into a
substitute for a non-existent National Theatre.
The Shakespearean productions of the early
war years featured many stars who were
‘appearing for next to nothing at the Old Vic
because they realize that the battle of the Old
Vic is one we cannot afford to lose’.42 This
‘battle’, however, had become more than a
struggle for the continuing well-being of the
playhouse. Fought with Shakespeare in the
vanguard, it was about defending Britain’s
cultural heritage in total war. According to
Theatre World, this battle would ‘live in the
annals of the English theatre for all time’ as
the artists involved ‘have served the cause
of culture in this country with unremitting
energy and self-sacrifice’.43
Acknowledging this service, and realizing
its propaganda potential, CEMA stepped in
and established at the Old Vic an interim
National Theatre with its own repertory com-
pany presenting a programme of classics in
1944. CEMA was not only prepared to meet
the ‘bold and generous expenditure’ – in the
words of Lord Keynes ‘good round sums,
well into five figures’ – and agreed to pay ‘an
advance cheque of £5,000’ immediately, but
also secured the services of a star-studded
company headed by two of Britain’s most
celebrated actors, Laurence Olivier and Ralph
Richardson, although both were on active
military service.44
Lord Lytton, chairman of the governors of
the Old Vic, therefore, wrote to the First Lord
of the Admiralty and asked for their release.
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In his letter he used a dual strategy. First,
he stressed the close links between the Old
Vic and CEMA, which, ‘I need hardly add,
expresses the cultural policy of the Board of
Education, and is financed by the Treasury’.
This hint at CEMA’s role as the official body
sanctioned by the government to carry out
national cultural politics was clearly aimed
at adding additional weight to Lytton’s let -
ter. Second, he argued on straightforward
political and propaganda lines that ‘the im -
portance need hardly be stressed of having
such a company in existence while the war is
in progress’, adding that ‘the many thous -
ands of overseas visitors in London make it
highly desirable that British drama, and
particularly the classics, should be presented
in the best possible manner’.45
The fact that these two actors were indeed
duly released to become joint directors of the
Old Vic is another indication of how much
the political landscape had changed within a
few years and illustrates the new role theatre
had acquired (also exemplified by the fact
that in 1946 both received knighthoods). The
institution of the Old Vic as a National
Theatre presenting a classical repertoire had
come to be seen as part of Britain’s war effort,
and met with immediate popular and critical
acclaim. Audiences packed the performances
and commentators claimed that these Old
Vic seasons were the best in British theatre
for decades. The company quickly became
an ‘emblem of national consciousness second
only to Shakespeare’.46
Interestingly, the new Labour government
after the war quickly made the National
Theatre part of its own agenda. When the
National Theatre Bill was presented to
Parliament in early 1949, politicians praised
the opportunity for it to become a truly
popular theatre, making Britain’s national
heritage available to everyone. The Lord
Chancellor, William Jowett, asserted that
people could finally reclaim their heritage,
which had been the privilege of the ruling
classes for so long: 
Britain can now show, with the coming of age of
her working classes, that they can emulate the
standards given them by their guardians. . . . By
the building of a national theatre we shall, I hope,
make a real contribution to the idea of a people’s
civilization.47
Shakespeare and the Classical Revival
Classical drama corresponded perfectly to
government concepts of entertainment and
education. It was felt that this could mark a
return to Britain’s great theatrical past, make
people aware of their national heritage, and,
therefore, play an important role in the war
effort. In contrast to the First World War,
which, as many claimed, had been charac -
terized by cheap entertainment and pointless
farces, commentators were anxious to see
dramatic standards now reach the highest
possible level.48
In 1940 Donald Wolfit presented a series
of popular lunchtime performances of Shake-
speare; the Old Vic company played King
Lear and The Tempest to capacity houses,49
and even rarely performed Restoration com -
edies received glittering revivals. The 1943
Festival of English Comedy proved to be one
of the highlights of the season, and William
Congreve’s Love for Love was one of the
greatest overall theatrical successes of war -
time London.50
Plays for long regarded as dated and out
of step with contemporary taste returned to
the stages now, and com mentators expressed
enthusiasm not only for what they saw as a
new kind of adult education but also for the
new aesthetic quality of repertoires.51 They
observed that the wartime hunger for
entertainment had not just resulted in farce
and swing, but in Shake speare and Elgar.52
Shakespeare was of course affirmed as ‘our
great national poet’,53 and the Manchester
Guardian asserted that ‘no better National
Service can be given at the present time, than
to present Shakespearean Repertory’.54 This
was in marked contrast to the sparse number
of interwar productions of Shakespearean
drama, when commentators pointed out that
‘Shakespeare is always a difficulty’55 illus -
trating a general feeling that ‘this kind of
highbrow thing was best left to occasional
London visits by the Comédie Française’.56
During the war, however, Shakespeare’s
plays received an increasing number of pro -
65
ductions, attracted the country’s greatest
actors and producers,57 and were seen by
record audiences. In August 1942 alone three
new Shakespeare revivals started their runs
in London with Gielgud’s Macbeth, the Old
Vic’s Othello, and Robert Atkins’s open-air
productions in Regent’s Park.58 And in 1944
the Old Vic at the New as well as Gielgud at
the Haymarket established their classical
reper tory. These ventures more than any -
thing else appeared to contemporaries as the
dramatic highlight of the war, the quintes -
sence of what Britain was fighting for.59
This sudden revival was no coincidence
but was closely linked to the war. Although
the use of Shakespeare for political purposes
was not new, the scale and quality of the
revival not only in London but also in the
provinces seems unparalleled in British his -
tory.60
The 1916 tercentenary of Shakespeare’s
death, for example, failed to attract enough
support to found the National Theatre, that
an influential pressure group had been pro -
moting for decades.61 In the early 1940s, how-
ever, their idea not only reappeared on the
political agenda, but quickly became reality
with a prestigious site for the project found
and generous funding provided.
Contemporary commentators clearly saw
the connection between this renewed debate
and the increased importance of Shakespeare
during the war.62 The Bard was used to estab-
lish a link to Elizabethan England – Hitler’s
invasion army defeated in the same way as
was the Spanish Armada,63 victory against the
odds achieved as at Agincourt in Olivier’s
film of Henry V. Other commentators made
links with Napoleon, one headline declaring
‘Appreciation of Shakespeare Unparalleled
Since Waterloo’.64
It was made clear that to produce Shake -
speare at this particular time was a service to
the nation, since, although Britain faced an
enemy invasion, her ‘spirit is undimmed and
her speech . . . is still the speech of Shake -
speare’.65 Corresponding to pre-war calls for
concerted efforts for a specifically national
propaganda,66 Shakespeare as a ‘national
institution’ was regarded as a perfect carrier
for such a positive approach. The Bulletins
from Britain regularly featured articles about
theatre in Britain, about festivals and memo -
rable productions especially of Shake -
spearean drama. The fact that Shakespeare’s
name in particular appeared again and again
not only gave ‘a reflection of the new spirit in
England’.67 It also made clear that nobody
could claim any more that theatre was with -
out a political purpose in this war. It had a
clear function and it lived up to it.68
It was not only the presence of Shake -
spearean drama on stage, however, which
seemed important, but also the interpreta -
tion of his plays. Commentators praised the
Old Vic’s 1941 production of King John for its
topical interpretation and its ‘consistent war-
like atmosphere’.69 Sybil Thorndike was con -
gratulated on her apparent presentation of
Macbeth as Hitler on her Welsh tour, and a
particularly strong anti-Nazi message must
have been sent out by the performance of
Shy lock by the émigré Frederick Valk in The
Merchant of Venice in 1943.70
Morrison’s Law
The success of the government’s new policy
towards the performing arts, however, was
sporadic. Funding remained limited to a
number of flagship companies and straight -
forward government control of the arts was
undesirable in a war which stressed the sup -
remacy of the freedom provided by western
democracies over the total dictatorships of
central Europe. And yet the government
wanted to be sure – just in case. 
In a move neglected by researchers so far,
Home Secretary Herbert Morrison intro -
duced legislation which allowed in theory
for direct state intervention in the arts. In a
memorandum on public entertainments in
wartime put before the War Cabinet on 27
February 1942, Morrison asked it to ‘con sider
the present position and make a decision on
general policy’ – including the theatre.71
He complained that his powers regard ing
entertainments were restricted to security and
safety questions, and claimed that the Home
Secretary should have additional powers to
prohibit performances if they were detri men-
tal to the war effort. Morrison asserted that: 
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it therefore appears necessary that the Govern -
ment should be empowered to prohibit or restrict
entertainments on the ground that they are inimi -
cal to the war effort, irrespective of the degree of
risk to those present, and that the Defence Regu la -
tions should be amended to give control of enter -
tainments in circumstances where the effici ent
prosecution of the war is in issue.72
The Cabinet discussed Morrison’s far-reach -
ing memorandum in early March 1942, and
only two weeks later the King signed the
relevant amendment to the defence regula -
tions.73 This enabled the Home Secretary to 
prohibit or restrict . . . the use of premises . . . for
the purposes of any entertainment, exhibition,
performance, amusement, game or sport to which
members of the public are admitted, in so far as
such prohibition or restriction appears . . . to be
necessary or expedient.74
Morrison had thereby obtained ‘control of
entertainments’ and, in effect, had at least in
principle gained total power over the per -
forming arts.75 Although there is no proof that
Morrison actually used his new powers of
direct control, the importance of the fact that
in theory he would have been able to do so
can hardly be overestimated.76 ‘Morri son’s
law’ made possible direct state intervention –
a power that commentators so far had solely
attributed to Goebbels.
The ‘Rebirth of the Theatre’
The Second World War triggered funda m en -
tal changes for Britain – and not exclu sively
in military, political, and socio-economic
terms. In this article I have argued that the
changes in the arts, as exemplified here by
the theatre, have been fundamental and long-
lasting – notably, without CEMA there
would have been no Arts Council. 
More generally, elementary beliefs in the
independence of theatre from state interven -
tion, the benefit of its commercial character,
and fears of failing to attract audiences for
intellectually challenging productions were
put into question.77 Particularly significant is
the fact that, although Britain had to cope
with the most desperate war effort in its
history, only a minority objected to spending
public money on the arts. A public opinion
survey carried out in 1943 showed that fifty-
nine per cent supported continuing govern -
ment support of the theatre after the war.78
The ‘rebirth of the theatre’, in Laurence
Olivier’s words, was closely linked to the
war and to a change in official and public
attitude towards the function of theatre in
society.79
Crucially, as part of the change of atti -
tudes, the increased governmental stake in
the arts also triggered the issue of how best
to control them. ‘Morrison’s law’, to critics
of state intervention, clearly illus trated the
possible dangers of the state ‘meddling with
the arts’.80 And after the war it became clear
that the new powers given to authorities in
the 1948 Local Government Act were not
always taken up with enthusiasm. Although
local authorities now had the option of
spending the sum of sixpence in the pound
on entertainments, which made a possible
total of eight million pounds available for
sub sidy, a 1958 report commis sioned by the
Arts Council found the overall picture of
local spending on the arts discouraging. 
Still, the war years had a profound impact
not only on fundamental and long-held
beliefs regarding the function of theatre but
also regarding tangible outcomes, chiefly
among these the decision of Parliament in
1949 to spend £1m to erect a purpose-built
National Theatre. In circumstances that the
protagonists of the National Theatre move -
ment could only have dreamt of at the turn
of the century, commentators noted that ‘in
spite of the financial difficulties in which the
country found itself, no one demurred to the
proposed expenditure by the State of a mil -
lion pounds on a project which a few years
before would have been the subject of bitter
controversy’.81 It can hardly be claimed,
therefore, that ‘the most obvious effects of the
conflict on London theatre were physical’ –
far from it. 
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